The wearing of religious symbols has been subject to more or less restrictive national regimes. In Europe, the Convention of Human Rights sets transnational conditions in this regard and has recently been interpreted to give great leeway to national states. Open-face communication is now being accepted an indispensable requirement of "living together" that qualifies as "rights and freedoms of others" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 ECHR. In S.A.S. v France, the ECHR created a new ground to justify interference with the freedom of religious expression. This article questions the Court`s expansion of existing grounds of justification as no sufficient legal basis exists and sociocultural considerations do not protect individual rights as required under the term "rights and freedoms of others". To that end, the basis for grounds of justification is examined in light of the evolution of the Court´s jurisprudence on the wearing of religious symbols. While public security and order, health and improper proselytism are well-established reasons for interference, the Court`s acceptance of secular orders highlights the ambiguity of the terms "pluralism" and "tolerance" as referred to in case-law. The article finds that this jurisprudence has given significant leeway to Member States in regulating religious expression and paved the way for the Court`s new approach under which behavioural social norms may be used to ban face-covering religious cloth. In addition, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation does not justify the expansion of the legitimate aims pursued under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR.
Introduction
The wearing of religious symbols has been controversially discussed both from a socio-political 1 as well as legal 2 perspective. There is rarely any area in which the tension between cultural context and legal requirements become imminent as in the case of religious freedom. 3 In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 4 , the focus of adjudication has not been so much the question of internal freedom of religion (i.e. the right to believe or not believe) 5 , but rather the freedom of religious expression. In particular, the wearing of religious symbols has been subject of adjudication before the ECHR on many occasion and not limited to the wearing of the famous headscarf. 6 The question of lawfulness of a ban of the wearing of religious symbols has been ruled on in different contexts allowing distinctions between the addressee of the ban (teachers 7 , pupils 8 or students 9 ), the place of religious expression (public place 10 , state-run educational institution 11 
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This refers to cases where the safeguarding of secular principles is at stake, see Leyla Sahin v Turkey (supra n 9), para. 115; Dogru v France (supra n 8), para. 72. 14 L. Garlicki / M. Jankowska-Gilberg (supra n 6), at 131. Unlike in previous case-law, this judgement thus does not concern questions of public security or public order, nor whether the ban is required by secular principles of a state. Also, the judgement does not concern the case-law of improper proselytism through the wearing of the burqa. The main issue is about a state's right to make obligatory for its citizens a certain behaviour that it deems an element of an essential consensus of society and, on that basis, to declare illegal religiously motivated wearing customs.
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The central thesis of this contribution addresses precisely the Court`s recent expansion of grounds for justification. By recognizing indispensable requirements of "living together" as valid ground for interference with the freedom of religion, the ECHR creates a new category of justification which goes beyond the ones previously recognized, thereby extending the ground of justification to general public interest considerations. Hitherto the justification of interference with Article 9 para. 2 ECHR has been confined to the grounds of justification exhaustively enumerated in this provision.
The Court considers the new category of indispensable requirements to fall under the established ground of justification, namely the "protection of rights and freedoms of others" under Article 9
para. 2 ECHR. This approach is not convincing, as it abandons the requirement of rights granting individual protection and instead extends this notion to capture mere sociocultural norms rooted in considerations of the general public interest which, in turn, is not covered by the "rights of others" in the sense of Article 9 para. 2 ECHR as argued by the Court. Against this background, the structure of this paper is as follows: Chapter II addresses the system of justifications under Article 9 para. 2 of the Convention and examines the extent and limitations of possible grounds to ban the wearing of religious symbols. In particular, the categories of improper proselytism and secularism are discussed with a view to highlighting the evolutionary process and the difficulties in applying these grounds of justification. Indeed, the origins of the recent expansion of grounds of justification can be traced in the Court`s prohibition of improper proselytism and the recognition of secular order of society. On that basis, Chapter III focuses on the justification based on the "protection of rights and freedoms of others" as ground invoked by the Court to use sociocultural considerations for the justification of interventions against religious expression. The article explores the compatibility of the mandatory character of sociocultural behavioural rules with the concept of freedoms protecting individual rights of others. Finally, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation will be considered as potentially leaving wide discretion to Member States to interfere with the freedom of religion.
The grounds of justification for interferences with the freedom to wear religious symbols under the ECHR
Under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR, the freedom of religion is a qualified right, i.e. it can be subject to limitations prescribed by law and pursuing legitimate aims. In that sense, the provision has similar qualifications as Article 8, 10 and 11 ECHR. However, Article 9 para. the rights and freedoms of others. In addition, Article 18 ECHR stipulates the exclusive character of the legitimate reasons to restrict the freedoms of the ECHR.
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A. Public security and public order
Interferences with the freedom of religion can be justified on grounds of interests of public security and public order. Public security does not have a uniform scope throughout all provisions of the ECHR. 23 It is understood not to be identical with the term of public security commonly referred to under police law, nor can a uniform meaning be deduced from the various language versions of the Convention. 24 Generally, however, public security can be defined to cover the security of state and its institutions as well as the protection of life and health of its population. Concerning the term public order, the Court stated in an obiter dictum this term to be defined as "ordre public".
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In relation to the wearing of religious symbols, the public security has been relevant as ground of justifications on various occasions. In the public space, interference can be permitted where sensitive security interests are at stake and thus a person must be easily identifiable. While Article 8 para. 2, Article 10 para. 2 and Article 11 para. 2 ECHR refer to "national security" / "Sécurité national" and "public safety" / "sureté nationale" as legitimate aims, Article 9 para. 2 ECHR mentions "interests of public safety" / "sécurité publique", see C. Grabenwarter (supra n 23), Article 9, para.83. 
B. Preventing improper proselytism
From the perspective of the protection of others (i.e. those possibly affected by the exercise of religious expression), the Court`s case-law on the prevention of improper proselytism is highly relevant and needs to be discussed in order to illustrate the Court`s concern about the negative freedom of religion. Indeed, the origins of the recent expansion of grounds of justification can be traced in the Court`s prohibition of improper proselytism and the recognition of secular order of society. The jurisprudence reflects the defensive stance the Court adopts vis-a-vis the impact religious expression has on other persons.
Converting others to his or her own belief is an essential element of the freedom of religion. Many religions consider active conversion of others to be duties of the believers. 33 It is obvious that this can generate conflicts with the freedom of others, namely with the negative freedom of religion, i.e.
the freedom not to have a religion. The line between legitimate and acceptable attempts to convert others and the improper proselytism are thus thin and blurry. 34 This makes it even more important to seek delineations between these two aspects of freedom of religion.
The negative freedom of religion in terms of the freedom to remain unaffected from the belief of others is a "right of others" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 ECHR. 35 In Dahlab v Switzerland, the ECtHR identified the right of pupils to remain unaffected by the proselytizing impact of the teacher's headscarf. Consequently, the Court affirmed the ban of the headscarf in that context, as the ban protected the childrens` right in a proportionate manner, although the ECtHR recognized the difficulties to determine the influence resulting from an external symbol on the freedom of religion and conscience of the children. 36 However, for the Court it was decisive that wearing a headscarf could potentially have a proselytizing effect which, according to the Court, would hardly be compatible with values such as tolerance, equality and the rights of others. The teacher's freedom of religion thus had to step back. 37 Therefore, the religious feelings of children and their parents as element of the negative freedom of religion prevailed over the teacher's positive freedom of religion. Similarly, the alleged negative influential power inherent in the wearing of religious symbols were also at stake in Leyla Sahin v Turkey. Dahlab v Switzerland (supra n 7), RJD 2001-V, at 13.
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E. Howard (supra n 2), at 60.
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In that case a female student was banned from taking the exam because she ignored the ban on wearing a headscarf imposed by the university.
that the university consequently had to take measures aiming at reducing the influence that fundamental religious groups could possibly exert on non-religious students. In such situations, the ban of religious symbol would pursue the goal of peaceful coexistence between students of distinct beliefs.
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The Court's jurisprudence concerning the proselytizing effect of the wearing of headscarves has been subject to criticism, because it rests on a certain stereotype of headscarf wearing women. This stereotype would characterize these women as fundamental and attempting to proselytize others. to express a form of contempt against those they encounter or otherwise to offend against the dignity of others". 44 This statement reflects more reluctance in giving religious symbols a meaning that is empirically not sufficiently supported.
From the above, it can be deduced that has been a general inclination in the Court`s jurisprudence to 39 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (supra n 9) (Chamber), para. 99. Another relevant aspect of the Court`s reasoning is the potential effect that wearing religious symbols may have not only on other non-religious persons but also on believers of the same religion, which may even push the latter to adapt the religious wearing habits, P. Weil (supra n 1), at 19. Similarly, in the case Begum, there was the concern that other Muslim girls would be pushed to wear headscarves as well, see L. view religious symbols as a threatening element to the freedoms of others. There seems to be a presumption of improper influence originating in these symbols without that sufficient evidence had been supported. This supports the view that there is kind of "presumption of indoctrination" 45 associated with the religious symbols. However, while this may explain the Court`s bias to the favour of shielding non-religious persons from religious influence, the Court`s approach seems still compatible with the notion of protecting the "rights of others" within the meaning of Article 9 para.
2 ECHR. The negative freedom of religion is one core right, as it shields the individual from religious influences. 46 The negative freedom of religion often is relevant in the relationship between state and citizens, particularly within state-owned institutions. Similarly important though is the public space in which individuals encounter each other and thus call for striking a balance between the positive (or "extravert") religious freedom on the one hand and the negative (or "introvert") religious freedom on the other hand. One can view a horizontal application of the freedom of religion as only the relation between private persons is concerned. Assigning horizontal effect to the negative freedom of religion implies the protection from improper proselytism. 47 In that sense, the jurisprudence on improper proselytism is connected to the established state obligation to protect against infringements of freedoms committed by other individuals. 48 The state actively protects the rights and freedoms of others against the impermissible invocation of freedoms. 49 On that basis, a link can be established to a further line of the Court's jurisprudence on justification grounds which is secularism and the safeguard of secular society to be discussed in the next section.
C. The safeguard of a secular society
The Court's general line of shielding persons possibly affected by religious expression is also reflected in its recognition of secularism as ground to encroach on religious freedoms. Accepting wide notions of secularism permitting states to intervene and ban religious expressions from public space is the conceptual basis to even accept socio-cultural considerations as ground for justification.
The notion of secularism as applied by the Court is thus essential for understanding the Court`s recent case-law.
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P. Ronchi (supra n 2), at 294 in relation tot he Muslim headscarf.
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The Court previously stated that the protection of the "rights of others" also serves the protection of the negative freedom of religion, see Kokkinakis v Greece (supra n 39), 17 EHRR 397. French ban is rooted in the specificity of the French constitution, namely the high priority of secularism. 53 The ECtHR underscored that secularism -similar to Turkey and Switzerlandconstitutes a constitutional principle recognized by the French citizens, the protection of which enjoys a high value. However, the Court fails to examine the characteristics of secularism and the criteria it has to meet in order to be a valid ground to interfere with religious expressions.
After all, secularism as ground for justification lacks clarity in its concept and, consequently, produces legal uncertainty in its application. This is rooted in the ambivalence of the term secularism. Generally, two distinct and opposing notions of secularism can be distinguished. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of this analysis because the ban of religious symbols appears to be compatible with only one of the notions of secularism. First, secularism can be interpreted as passive imperative of neutrality or non-intervention of the state. Thus, when interpreting secularism as "passive neutrality" 54 there is no room for an active role of the state as long as it acts without discriminating between religions. In this vein, secularism only requires neutrality from the state but not from its citizens. 55 In line with this reasoning, the Court's decisions against Greece 56 and 50 M. Hunter-Henin (supra n 2), at 635; G. van der Schyff / A. Overbeeke (supra n 1), at 429; D. McGoldrick (note 6), 453.
51
Leyla Sahin (supra n 9) (Chamber), para. 108, (Great Chamber), para. 155.
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Leyla Sahin (supra n 9), para. 99 E. Howard (supra n 2), at 48.
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Kokkinakis v Greece (supra n 39), para. 31. S. Poulter (supra n 59), at 50; see also C. Rumpf, Das Laizismusprinzip in der Rechtsordnung der Republik Türkei, Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts 36 (1987), at 179, 183. In Ludin II (supra n 46), the German Federal Constitutional Court has distinguished between two distinct meaning of state neutrality in public schools. First, neutrality can be understood as inclusive neutrality implying that symbols of all religions would be allowed in schools as expression of pluralism and tolerance. Second, neutrality can be understood in schools as irreligious neutrality, which strictly separates religion and education in order to avoid conflicts, see N. Nathwani (supra n 59), at 228.
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N. Nathwani (supra n 59), at 229. E. Howard (supra n 2), at 38.
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Leyla Sahin (supra n 9). If an active secularism pursued by the state is being accepted by the Court, this would eventually imply an absence (or at least reduction) of religious expressions in the public sphere. Based on this understanding, it is no longer the freedom of religion of the individual which is at the core of the active secularism, but rather the attempt to "free" the public sphere from all possible religious symbols and connotations. However, this would ultimately decouple the freedom of religion from the individual, and absence of religious symbols in the public sphere would be at the central to this notion of secularism. The positive role of a state would lie in rolling back those forms of religious expression that seek to penetrate the public space.
A notion of secularism accepting bans of religious symbols in the public sphere (and beyond bans in 68 state-owned institutions 72 ) evokes criticism from the view of "pluralism". In spite of the foregoing, there is no doubt that secularism both in its active and passive conceptualization has a connection to protecting individual rights. Reducing the prevalence of religious symbols in the public sphere does not only serve an abstract and vague public goal of secularism seeking to delineate the public and religious spheres. In addition, secularism has an individual-oriented dimension and recognizes the negative freedom of religion of the individual 72 See the cases referred to supra n 7-9 concerning pupils, students and teachers who are strongly connected with the state`s obligation to neutrality. who is part of the public sphere where individuals bearing both positive and negative freedom of religion. The concept of active secularism is not limited to rolling back religious influences originating in state conduct (e.g. the wearing of headscarf by teachers in school). It also identifies the need to apply secularism in a horizontal fashion between private persons requiring public sphere to remain free of religious symbols.
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In balance, the Court's approach towards accepting secularism as ground for justification raises doubts as it subjects national claims of secularism to hardly any judicial scrutiny. In particular, the 
A. The Court`s reasoning on "rights of others" and requirements of living together
The starting point of the Court's new line of jurisprudence is the argument put forward by France to justify the ban of face covering to which the Court referred to as "'respect for the minimum requirements of life in society' referred to by the Government -or of 'living together'" 81 .
There is no explanation provided by the Court on how such minimum requirements may be rooted in general public interest and how they result from the "rights of others". Instead, the ECtHR simply asserts that such values could, under certain circumstances, constitute a ground of justification under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR. The Court shows comprehension for the view that some citizens would reject practices in the public space which could question the relationships between persons and are an indispensable element of the "living together". The main critic towards this reasoning is that, unlike the justification grounds discussed above, reference to social considerations lack a connection to the "rights of others" as required under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR.
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The Court seems to accept views on social behaviour somehow linked to the general interest but The view of parts of French society is illustrated by the words of the French Minister of Justice that "(…) le port volontaire du voile intégral revient à se retrancher de la société nationale, à rejeter l'esprit même de la République, fondée sur le désir de vivre ensemble", Session of Senate 14.9.2010, at 6732.
"Moreover, the Court is able to accept that a State may find it essential to give particular weight in this connection to the interaction between individuals and may consider this to be adversely affected by the fact that some conceal their faces in public places.
[…] From that perspective, the respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society [...]. It can thus be said that the question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places constitutes a choice of society." 
B. Notions of living together lack the protection of "rights of others"
Is the Court`s reasoning compatible with the requirements of "rights of others" within the meaning of Article 9 para. 2 ECHR? The "rights of others" protect rights and positions conflicting with the freedom of religion. These rights of others include rights granted by national legal norms (both constitutional and other norms of lower rank) and rights accruing from the ECHR 88 ; they must be stipulated by law. 89 There is thus no caveat for considerations rooted in general public interest interest. 93 This finding is confirmed by a systematic comparison of the jurisprudence regarding Article 8 ECHR which provides for the same ground of justification. 94 The case-law of Article 8
ECHR concerning "rights of others" rests on the assumption that encroachments on the freedom can only be justified where the protection of predominant individual rights require to do so. phenomenon. It does not appear why different considerations should apply only because an openface communication is a sociocultural behavioural customs adapted in the majority part of the society. In sum, behavioural norms deduced from notions of "living together" do not constitute an individual right as required for interference with the freedom of religion to protect the "rights of others". Also, there is no basis to argue that the identifiability of the face would be "essential for the tolerance and broadmindedness".
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C. Margin of appreciation of Member States and limited judicial control
The ECtHR generally accords to Member States a wide margin of appreciation both in factual and legal terms. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation 103 is based on a political philosophy, according to which decisions produced by democratic societies are in principle well suited to ensure respect for human rights. Judicial control exercised by the ECHR must give due account of measures taken as a result of democratic decision-making processes. 104 Respect and tolerance vis-avis the democratic origin of measures contested before the ECHR require judicial restraint to a certain degree. This concept is further strengthened by the subsidiarity principle: Judicial restraint can be deduced from the function of the ECHR as an international court which by enforcing human rights performs only a subsidiary function in relation to Member States. 105 Finally, respect for cultural diversity is another strong argument for judicial restraint. The legal community reflects cultural and ideal diversity. In performing its task to interpret the Convention, the Court should contribute to maintaining this diversity or, at least, not to diminish it by imposing uniform solutions applicable across all democratic societies. 106 There are, however, limitations to the margin of appreciation. The terms of the ECHR are generally autonomous, that is to be interpreted independently from national legal orders. 107 In this vein, the Court frequently states that the margin of appreciation granted to national authorities "goes hand in hand with a European supervision". 108 Under no circumstances, the ECtHR must not do away with its genuine obligation to develop criteria of interpretation for the rights of the Convention. 109 An important parameter for the determination of Member States' margin of appreciation normally is the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the legal situation of the dispute at stake. Legislative conformity between Member States indicates a rather limited margin of appreciation. Existence or non-existence of conformity thus determines the scope of the margin. 110 Against this background, a comparative analysis of legal orders may help to specify the scope of margin. 111 Whenever the area of law relevant to the infringement of the individual right is addressed in a heterogeneous fashion, the Court exercises judicial restraints giving wide leeway to Member States. 112 In relation to the wearing of religious symbols in the Member States, the ECHR repeatedly stated that these issues have been addressed by individual Member States in very different ways, therefore not allowing to set a uniform European standard over all national legal orders. 113 The Court continued on this line of the State concerned, as it would depend on the specific domestic context. 114 Judicial restraint in a situation of legal heterogeneity in Member States is compatible with the general considerations supporting the margin of appreciation discussed above. Respecting decisions that were adopted in democratic societies and reflecting cultural diversity militates against the idea of imposing uniform standard and alignment, especially in cases where Member States deal in very different ways with an issue. This is plausible but also has to be seen in light of the effectiveness of the Convention. The margin of appreciation is effective only within the borders of the Convention and must not lead to an interpretation or application of the Convention that is no longer compatible with its clear wording. This implies that the grounds of justification under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR may not be loosened nor be extended. 115 The margin of appreciation thus becomes effective especially in instances where the wording is vague or unclear. Not surprisingly, the margin of appreciation has been considered wider in cases concerning "national security" 116 issues related to police 117 , which is linked to the vague legal term of "public security" under Article 9 para. 2 ECHR.
If the borderline of the margin of appreciation is the wording of the Convention, the most convincing area of relevance of the doctrine of margin is the judgement of the proportionality of a certain measure. Under the proportionality test, a measure must be suitable to reach a legitimate aim (which is mentioned in the Convention); it must be necessary to reach this aim and ultimately proportional in light of all interests concerned. 118 The Court undertakes only an evidence review of the proportionality. 119 This is in line with a broader trend in the Court's case-law on interpreting the subsidiarity principle which has been identified by judge Robert Spano as the Court's "qualitative, Consequently, one can barely argue in favor of a wide margin of appreciation but rather the margin should be limited given the overwhelming majority of countries that have not deemed it necessary to legislate on this issue.
Conclusions
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the wearing of religious symbols has been controversially discussed for quite long. One reason may be the multifaceted interests at stake. The criticism commonly raised is widespread reaching from the Court's alleged misinterpretation of religious symbols, the development of female or Muslim stereotypes, an overvaluing of the negative freedom of religion and the lack of sufficient judicial review where secularism is used as ground for interference. While some of the criticism seems to be biased by ideological controversies, there is merit to the observation that the freedom of religious expression has been clearly ranked lower than the negative freedom of religion. This is partly due to the Court´s generous acceptance of national 
